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May 19: According to an article published in the NEW YORK TIMES (05/20/87), Citicorp's action
seems likely to cause further upheaval in the banking community and turmoil in financial markets.
Banking companies are expected to face pressure from investors and regulators to begin building
their own reserves. To the extent that this reduces these banks' earnings many of them, in fact, could
be thrown into red ink stock prices could plummet. "It certainly will put a lot of pressure on the
other banks," said Ronald I. Mandle, banking analyst for Paine Weber, Inc.
The decision by Citicorp to build its loss reserve by such a large amount has reportedly marked a
watershed in the history of the foreign debt crisis. Although Citicorp chairman John Reed insisted
that the action was not meant to place a value on the bank's $14.7 billion in loans to Third World
nations, some banking experts argue that by building the reserve Citicorp has done precisely that.
Citicorp's action marks the first meaningful recognition that loans to the developing world are
not worth anywhere near their face value. "It is clearly a departure from the position of Citicorp's
former chairman, Walter Wriston, that countries do not go bankrupt but pay their debts in full," said
Christine Bindert, a senior vice president of Shearson/Lehman Bros. Inc and an authority on global
debt. "If you really believe that, then you don't build reserves."
The move may be in Citicorp's long term interest. Many analysts argue that by taking this step, the
bank was putting most if not all of its Third World debt problem behind it. They suggest that the
bank can now focus its energies on the rest of its businesses. Reed, in an effort to show that this
interpretation was valid, declared that Citicorp would maintain its dividend policy. "We would
expect to pay and increase our dividends if the underlying business is good," he said.
International monetary experts said Citicorp's move should strengthen the company and toughen
its position in negotiating new loans to developing countries. "I consider this a very positive move,"
said one official. "I expect it will be followed by other banks." "It will be very hard for other banks
not to follow suit," one New York banker said on May 19. "I expect you will see a dramatic increase
in loan loss reserves by other banks." Another investment banker said, "Not a lot of the other banks
are in a position to do this because they don't have the capital base the Citibank has. This thing has
been like a cancer, and I think John Reed just got sick and tired of it and decided to cut it out."
A number of questions remain and will undoubtedly be decided in the near future. First, how will
the debtor countries respond? One possible view is that Citicorp has in effect delivered an affront to
these countries, valuing their loans at a fraction of their original value. In an effort to soften such an
impact, Reed said that Citicorp had delivered letters explaining the bank's move to the presidents of
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines. Reed did not disclose the contents of the letter. Two,
will the debtor nations begin seeking fresh concessions from their bank creditors? They may argue
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that the banks are in a position to provide additional relief because they have already absorbed a
blow against earnings. Three, will the move have a negative effect on the "collegial atmosphere" that
has existed until now between the banks and their third-world creditors?
Some banks, such as J.P. Morgan, are highly profitable and may follow Citicorp's cue. Others,
like Manufacturers Hanover and the Bank of America, have been reporting less than spectacular
financial results. Bank of America has, potentially, a lot to lose. This company, the second largest
banking concern in the US, is a major creditor to Latin America. The bank has already suffered huge
losses from bad loans, and further setbacks could dash hopes for returning to operating profitability
this year.
In a statement on May 19, Bank America said, "Bank America's loan loss reserves are appropriate
for the asset mix in its overall portfolio. We are aware of no developments which would produce a
need for adjustments to this reserve. The bank has made significant additions to its reserve in recent
quarters." May 21: According to an article published in the NEW YORK TIMES, Citicorp's decision
to effectively treat $3 billion of its foreign loans as uncollectible will probably make the debt crisis
even more difficult and acrimonious. Among the expected results are reduced lending to debtor
countries, more painful debt reschedulings, louder calls for a governmental solution to the debt
problem, and increased fragmentation of the banking community.
The action by Citicorp has undermined the long-time approach toward dealing with the problem:
banks acting in unison to revise the terms of old loans while providing new money. A new approach
to the debt crisis is expected to emerge in the wake of the Citicorp decision. Banking professor at
Northwestern University's Kellogg School, Stuart Greenbaum, said, "If there is additional lending, it
will be on much tougher terms."
In Latin America, government officials and debt specialists expect future debt talks to be more
problematic. Citicorp's move is being interpreted by private sector and financial media analysts as
a distinct blow to the Baker Plan in which bank lending is considered to be a crucial aspect of debt
crisis relief. "If Citicorp, in a good position as anyone to assess the climate for lending, says it does
not expect $3 billion of its foreign loans to be repaid, other banks will be loath to place their own
capital at risk."
Citicorp also said it will seek to reduce its loan exposure in the developing world during the next
two years by selling some of its loans and engaging in so-called debt-for-equity swaps. "You
can't be building reserves on your old loans," said George M. Salem, senior banking analyst at
the Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. "The ability of the banks to extend new credit
has been dealt a blow." The tenor of future debt-rescheduling talks could turn decidedly more
acrimonious. Some analysts asserted that Citicorp's bargaining position had been weakened. They
believe that now that Citicorp has taken a "hit" against earnings and if, as expected, other big banks
will follow suit the debtor countries will respond by seeking debt forgiveness, arguing that the loans
could be forgotten without any further impact on the banks' profits.
The prevalent view, however, is just the opposite. These analysts argue that Citicorp, having
taken its lumps, is in a better position to be patient in future debt talks. Other banks that build
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loss reserves for their foreign loans will be similarly able to take a hard-line approach. And if,
as many experts suggest, the debtor countries view Citicorp's move as a direct assault on their
creditworthiness, the result could be heated negotiations. "It is a new era for the debt," said
Christine Bindert, a former economist at the IMF, now a senior vice president at Shearson, Lehman
Bros., Inc. "This is the first time that a bank has recognized that the debt is not a liquidity problem
but a basic structural problem. We are finally addressing the real issue after five years of muddling
through."
Political ramifications are also expected. Robert Rothstein, director of the Program in International
Relations at Colgate University, said Citicorp was trying to send two messages. One was directed
at the developing countries: the bank is no longer willing to abide by the status quo of forever
restructuring debts so as to allow other, weaker banks to continue reporting profits. The other
message, aimed at the governments of the commercial banks' nations, the IMF, the World Bank and
other international lending agencies, is that Citicorp expects increased public participation in return
for the sacrifice it is making. Citicorp will suffer a $2.5 billion loss in the second quarter, the second
largest deficit ever for a US corporation.
Citicorp chairman John Reed said the move would cost its shareholders "a year's worth of earnings."
"They have said they have gone as far as they can," Rothstein said, "and that somebody else has got
to do something or there will be a substantial crisis. It is a major step toward an outright demand for
political intervention." But even if additional public money is applied to the debt crisis, participation
by commercial banks will still be necessary. That, in turn, will require more of the cooperation
that had allowed US banks at least to work together in so- called loan advisory committees so as to
continually restructure maturing third world loans.
However, this "collegial" atmosphere has been eroding as more and more banks, particularly
regional banks in the US, have concluded that the debt crisis is showing no signs of improvement.
Moreover, debt experts have spoken of a rift between the US banks and the major lenders of Europe
and Japan, which long ago established large reserves for their foreign loans. Citicorp's action may
cause the collegiality among the largest US banks to fall apart. Citicorp acted on its own, without
consulting any other big banks on the advisory committees. By building its reserve, Citicorp has
placed immediate pressure on other institutions to do likewise. But weaker institutions, such as
Manufacturers Hanover, the Bank of America and some banks in Texas are not in a position to
follow in Citicorp's footsteps.
The expected results are resentment toward Citicorp, and an unwillingness to work with the giant
bank in future debt negotiations. "To an important extent, Citicorp has done what is good for it,"
said Stephen Berman, banking analyst at County Securities, Inc. "It will erode the collegiality
somewhat." Rudiger Dornbusch, the Ford International Professor of Economics at MIT, added, "The
more you have episodes like this, the harder it is to keep the cartel of banks together." May 22: In the
WASHINGTON POST, Hobart Rowen writes that the "only surprise" regarding the Citicorp action
was "why it had taken so long for at least one institution to face reality."
Despite this dose of reality, Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Freres & Co., said Citicorp's action "clearly jars
the financial system. It's a fissure running up and down the walls. Right now, you can't tell how
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far it's going to go." Rowen states that since 1982 it has been clear that much of the Third World's
$1 trillion debt of which Latin America accounts for almost $400 billion would never be paid back.
Yet the debt was allowed to continue to grow. While Washington urged them on, the commercial
banks continued to loan the debtor nations money in order for them to pay interest on old loans.
"That maintained the fiction that the loans were good. Thus, the banks could avoid what Citicorp
finally owned up to: an acknowledgment that many of their loans were "nonperforming," and were
bringing in no earnings.
In Citicorp's case, there was a gutsy decision to take a `hit' a record loss of profits of $2.5 billion
in the second quarter." Next, according to Rowen, Washington has been avoiding reality as well.
Treasury Secretary James Baker's debt plan introduced in 1985 was grounded on the recognition of
the futility of the previous strategy, i.e., economic adjustment policies which prevented economic
growth. The Baker Plan required $20 billion in new loans from the commercial banks, $9 billion from
multilateral development banks, market-oriented "reforms" by the debtor nations, and the World
Bank assuming the lead in managing the whole crisis.
However, the Baker initiative ran into problems from the outset, as commercial banks resisted their
role in the plan, debtor nation governments were reluctant to implement so-called reforms at the
cost of further domestic political and social upheaval, and the World Bank was apparently reluctant
to act as crisis manager, a role which was never clearly articulated.
Rowen points out that in an interview prior to the Citicorp announcement, World Bank president
Barber Conable said he has been perfectly willing to inherit the mantle of leadership discarded by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after 1985, but that no one had defined what leadership
means. "They've got to understand that a lot of what's said to be `leadership' is acceptance of
additional risk and additional burdens by the World Bank," Conable argued. "And if we are going
to do that, we should do it with a full understanding of what it involves additional capital, additional
budgetary costs all of the things we have some resistance to."
According to Rowen, Citicorp's action implies that less, rather than more, resources are going to
be committed by the commercial banks to "salvaging the Third World mess." Next, he states that
despite denials by the Treasury Department and Citicorp chairman John Reed, the Baker Plan may
have suffered a mortal blow. When asked about the implications of Citicorp's action on the Baker
Plan, Rohatyn responded: "It is hard to imagine that it will lead to anything except a sharp reduction
in lending by the banks."
Moreover, Rohatyn pointed out, major borrowers, such as Brazil or Argentina, may decide that "if
it looks less likely that they are going to get more money, and that loans will be written down, they
will say, `Why not act unilaterally ourselves in respect to debt service?'" Thus, says Rowen, a major
assumption of the Baker initiative that the banks will increase the flow of capital to debtor nations,
enabling them to sustain their debt service payments appears to be in jeopardy.
Although Federal Reserve and Treasury officials say other banks don't have to follow Citicorp's
lead, auditors and independent directors may be concerned that they may later be charged with
imprudence if they, too, do not write off bad debts. Some banks cannot afford to duplicate Citicorp's
LADB Article Id:  76650
ISSN:  1060-4189
©2011  The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved. Page 5 of 5
action, and will have to rely on the Federal Reserve to help bail them out. That extra liquidity could
lead to rising inflation and interest rates.
-- End --
